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Abstract 
 
We study charitable giving within social groups. Exploiting a unique dataset, we 
establish three key relationships between social group size and fundraising outcomes: 
(i) a positive relationship between group size and the total number of donations; (ii) a 
negative relationship between group size and the amount given by each donor;  
(iii) no relationship between group size and the total amount raised by the fundraiser. 
We rule out classic free-riding to explain these relationships since the number of 
social group members is only a subset of total contributors. Instead, the findings are 
consistent with the notion that giving in social groups is motivated by “relational” 
warm glow.  
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1  Introduction 
Donations by individuals are an important source of income for charities – $229 billion was donated 
in the US in 2012 and £10 billion in the UK – yet underlying individual motives for giving are not 
well understood. One possibility is that donors are motivated to give for altruistic reasons; that is, 
they care about the total amount of public good that is provided. Another is that donors give 
because they gain direct utility from the act of giving; that is, they experience a “warm glow” from 
giving (Andreoni, 1990). There is also interest in how donations may be determined in a “charity 
market” (List, 2011) where donors interact with other key players, including fundraisers and/or 
charities who are active in seeking donations through their own fundraising efforts. In this paper, we 
consider the situation where the fundraiser has existing personal relationships with potential donors 
and how such relationships may affect donations. This is important in practice since a lot of 
charitable giving takes place in social settings unrelated to charitable activity – in the UK, for 
example, 18% of donors report having sponsored family and friends for charity, while 13% gave in 
the workplace.2 In such settings, existing personal relationships are likely to affect giving behaviour; 
Table 1 summarizes donors’ perceptions of which factors are important determinants of how much 
they gave in response to an individual fundraiser showing that the personal relationship between the 
donor and the fundraiser comes near the top of the list, well above tax incentives, for example.  
We propose the idea of a “relational” warm glow motivation for giving in social group 
settings – that is, a motivation to give that comes from a donor’s altruism towards a member of their 
social group who engages in individual fundraising activities and who experiences a warm glow from 
the amount of money that is raised from their fundraising effort. This kind of individual-led 
fundraising has become very popular, at least in the UK (21 million individual fundraisers using the 
leading website since 2001), and is an important source of fundraising income for many charities. 
The basic idea is that individuals engage in fundraising activities – anything from running a 
marathon to shaving their head – in order to raise money for their chosen charity. A key feature is 
that fundraisers typically exploit their existing social networks, asking their friends, family and 
colleagues to sponsor them and make a donation. We explore giving in this social group setting 
empirically, exploiting a unique dataset of individual-led fundraising activity that links the donations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Source: Citizenship Survey, 2008-­‐09 (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009) 
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that are made to individual fundraisers’ online fundraising pages to an observable proxy for the size 
of the fundraisers’ social group. 
We have a very rich dataset comprising all donations made to nearly 40,000 fundraising 
pages; importantly, our data also contain information about the number of Facebook friends of the 
fundraisers. While the number of Facebook friends cannot be taken to be the universe of the 
fundraiser’s entire social group, we find compelling evidence to support the idea that it is a 
meaningful proxy. We see in our data that the size of social groups varies enormously across 
fundraisers – at the 10th percentile of the distribution, a fundraiser has 82 Facebook friends, while at 
the 90th percentile, the number is 701. We are interested in how this variation in social group size 
affects donations both theoretically and empirically. Importantly, our data also contain key 
characteristics including the fundraisers’ age, income and gender which allow us to control for 
factors that might be correlated with both social group size and giving behaviour 
We find strong evidence that social group size matters. Controlling for age, income and 
gender, the number of Facebook friends of the fundraiser is positively correlated with the number 
of donations to the page, but there is a negative correlation between the number of Facebook 
friends and the size of donations. We can rule out that, in larger groups, marginal donors give less 
since the negative relationship applies even to the largest donation on the page. Ours is therefore a 
robust finding that donors in larger social groups give less. On the surface, it would seem that this 
finding fits the predictions of the basic model of non-cooperative giving (as developed by 
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986). But, this conclusion is unwarranted as there is no reason to 
think that the number of Facebook friends of any particular fundraiser is correlated with the total 
number of contributors to the public good. The most popular charity for which people fundraise is 
Cancer Research UK, which receives nearly £100 million in donations each year – completely 
dwarfing the amount raised by any individual fundraiser. Thus, there is no reason to think that the 
basic model can explain the negative correlation that we see in our data.  
An alternative model of giving that could be invoked to explain the empirical results is one 
where giving is motivated by a “relational” warm glow – fundraisers experience “warm-glow” from 
the donations they raise, and the fundraisers’ Facebook friends are altruistic towards the fundraisers. 
In such a model, fundraising success is a “local” public good to the social group and thus a public 
good for which incentives will vary locally with social group size. In this case, personal relationships 
become crucial to explaining motives for giving.   
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Our paper builds on the existing literature on the relationship between group size and 
private contributions to public goods, but adds to it along several important dimensions. Models of 
the non-cooperative private provision of public goods that are based on collective consumption 
motives predict that individual donations are negatively related to the total number of contributors, 
i.e. there is free-riding, and that individual contributions approach zero as the number of 
contributors become very large.3 This result has been tested in a laboratory setting (Isaac and 
Walker, 1988; Isaac et al, 1994) and in a real world setting (Zhang and Zhu, 2010). In our case, 
however, the groups we look at are primarily social in nature; their primary purpose for interaction is 
not charitable activity. Second, as mentioned above, the members of the social group are only a 
subset of the total number of potential contributors to the public good, implying that any group size 
effect on public good provision will be a ‘local’ one, specific to the amount of public good funded 
by a subset of contributors. Thus, the situation that we study is of how socially-determined divisions 
of the universe of private contributors to a public good, along lines that are not directly relevant to 
the nature of the public good, can determine donation outcomes.  
Our paper also proposes an analytical framework that supports our evidence, generating 
predictions about the effect of relational warm glow motives for giving on donation size. There is 
little theoretical literature focusing on donations in these social group contexts. Exceptions are 
Benabou and Tirole (2006) who consider the case where people make contributions out of concerns 
for reputation or status and Scharf (2014) who focuses on the effect of the structure of social 
interactions on giving decisions. However, numerous empirical studies support the presence of 
social effects on giving. Among other things, donations have been found to be sensitive to: whether 
or not giving is publicly observable (Soetevent, 2005); social information and norms (Frey and 
Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 2008); social pressure (DellaVigna et al., 2012); and peer effects in 
solicitations and donations (Meer, 2011; Smith et al., 2012).  Many of these social effects are likely to 
interact with social group size, yet, to date, the sensitivity of donations to the size of social groups 
has not been explored. This paper extends this literature by presenting new evidence on the 
relationship between social group size and donations.  
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the individual 
fundraising context in more detail. Section 3 introduces the idea of relational warm glow and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This result is dampened if there are impurely altruistic motives for giving (Andreoni, 1990).  
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discusses mechanisms through which social group size may affect donation size. Section 4 describes 
the data and Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the 
findings.  
 
2  The individual fundraising context 
Alongside traditional fundraising activities, which involve a direct approach from a charity to 
potential donors, the past decade has witnessed a huge growth in individual-led online fundraising in 
the UK. Since 2001, more than 21 million individual fundraisers have raised in excess of £2 billion 
through online fundraising via the leading website, JustGiving.com. 
The way this type of fundraising activity works is as follows: individual fundraisers choose a 
charity for which to raise money and a fundraising event, such as running a marathon or shaving 
their head. These events can be very personal or can be mass participation events in which they raise 
money alongside other fundraisers. Fundraisers then set up a personalized webpage on a fundraising 
website that allows donors to give online and then they solicit donations. Fundraisers do this 
primarily by appealing to their existing social networks of friends, family and work colleagues. In a 
survey of more than 19,000 users of JustGiving.com,4 84% of those asked for a donation had been 
asked by a family member (of whom 87% said that they always gave when asked); 96% had been 
asked by a friend (67% always gave); 89% had been asked by a colleague (48% always gave) and 70% 
had been asked by a charity representative (only 9% always gave). In this setting, it is highly likely 
that existing personal relationships between the fundraiser and the donor affect donations and this is 
supported by the factors cited by donors as influences on their giving, summarized in Table 1.5  
Such individual-led fundraising has a double attraction for charities. First, it is cost-effective 
since charities do not need lists of potential donors, with individual fundraisers exploiting their 
existing social groups. Second, personal solicitations can be highly effective in encouraging 
donations, more so than solicitations from charity fundraisers (Meer, 2011). This may be because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Payne et al (2012). 
5 The context of online fundraising has been used previously to study peer effects in giving (Castillo, Petrie and Wardell, 
2014; Smith et. al., 2014), endogenous anonymity (Peacey and Sanders, 2013), and competition in fundraising (Payne, 
Scharf and Smith, 2014). However, the relationship between the size of the fundraiser’s social group and how much is 
donated has not been studied and this is the focus of this paper. 
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there is an endorsement of the charity, similar to the effect of a large, lead donation (Vesterlund, 
2003), it may also be because of the personal nature of “the ask”. In practice, however, the size of 
social groups will vary widely across individual fundraisers. Some will have a very large circle of 
friends, family and work colleagues that they can solicit; others will have much narrower social 
groups. The question of interest in this paper is how this kind of variation in social group size affects 
donors’ behaviour.  
3  Relational warm glow 
We begin with a brief overview of the standard model of private giving, in which N individuals 
make private contributions to a public good in a non-cooperative fashion (Warr, 1983; Bergstrom et. 
al., 1984). 
Suppose that all individuals each have an exogenously given income y , and that they each 
consume a private good and a pure public good in amounts respectively equal to x  and G , with G  
being funded with individual private contributions, v . Preferences are identical across individuals 
and are represented by an increasing, strictly concave utility function, U(x,G) . As is standard in this 
literature, assume that both the private good and the public good are strictly normal goods, that the 
public good and private good are measured in the same units, and that the marginal rate of 
transformation between the public good and the private good in production is unity. The 
individually optimal contribution by donor i ∈ 1,...,N{ }  maximizes U y − vi , vi + vij≠i∑( )  where, 
vij≠i∑  represents donations by other individuals. This yields the interior first-order condition 
−Ux y − vi , vi + vij≠i∑( ) +UG y − vi , vi + vij≠i∑( ) = 0 ; which, in a symmetric equilibrium with 
vi = v*  for all i ∈ 1,...,N{ }  and G* ≡ Nv* , can be re-written as 
 −Ux y − v*, Nv*( ) +UG y − v*, Nv*( ) = 0.   (1) 
Note that the level of provision in this equilibrium is inefficient – the optimal provision level is 
characterised by the Samuelson condition, N  MRSGx = 1 , while (1) gives MRSGx = 1 ; since MRSGx
is decreasing in x /G , this implies under-provision. 
Totally differentiating (1) with respect to v*  and N , we obtain 
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dv*
dN =
v* UxG y − v*, Nv*( )−UGG y − v*, Nv*( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
Uxx y − v*, Nv*( )−UGx y − v*, Nv*( )− N UxG y − v*, Nv*( )−UGG y − v*, Nv*( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
.  (2) 
The denominator of the ratio on the right-hand side of the above is negative by concavity, and the 
numerator is positive, making dv* / dN  negative. This basic framework thus predicts that as N  
becomes large, individual contributions, v* N( ) = G* N( ) / N , go to zero; that is, there is free-riding. 
The effect of an increase in 𝑁 on the total volume of contributions is  
 
dG*
dN = v
* + N dv
*
dN .  (3) 
This is negative if contributions are sufficiently elastic with respect to N , i.e. if dv* / dN  is 
sufficiently large in absolute value. 
In our empirical analysis we find a weakly negative correlation between the number of 
Facebook friends of fundraisers and the size of donations and little correlation between social group 
size and total contributions to the page. At first sight, it would seem that this finding fits the 
predictions of the basic model. Upon closer inspection, however, this conclusion is unwarranted. To 
see this, partition individuals in the economy so that N = NF + NE , where NF  is the number of 
Facebook friends of a fundraiser, and NE  is the number of other donors not belonging to the group 
of friends. In our data, we observe NF but not NE  – and thus not N – and there is no reason to 
think that the total number of contributors to the public good should be correlated to the number 
of people that are Facebook friends of a particular fundraiser. That is, there is no reason to think 
that the basic model can explain the correlations that we see in our data. 
An alternative specification that could be invoked to explain the empirical results is one 
where fundraisers experience “warm-glow” from the donations they raise, and where the members 
of the fundraisers’ social group are altruistic towards the fundraiser, which makes fundraising 
success a “local” public good to the social group – and thus a public good for which incentives will 
vary locally with NF . 
Formally, if fundraising success within the social group is measured by NFvF ≡VF  and total 
donations are G = NFvF +G−F (with G−F representing donations by individuals outside the group), 
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we can write the objective of individual Facebook friends as U x,G,VF( )with  U i( )  again strictly 
concave in its arguments. The first order condition is 
 −Ux y − v*,G−F + NFvF* , NFvF*( ) +UG y − v*,G−F + NFvF* , NFvF*( )   (4) 
 +UVF y − v
*,G−F + NFvF* , NFvF*( ) = 0.   
Here provision of VF   depends only on NF and not on NE , whereas provision of G  depends on 
both NF  and NE . In this specification, even though there is still no reason to assume that the total 
number of contributors to G  is related to the number of Facebook friends, the total number of 
contributors to VF will be related to the number of Facebook friends, and thus, through this 
channel, we can expect a negative correlation between vF  and NF , and possibly, a negative 
correlation between VF  and NF .6 
In sum, although we can rule out standard free-riding behaviour, a relational warm glow 
from the donor to the fundraiser (where the donor cares directly about the fundraiser and/or how 
much the fundraiser raises) provides one plausible channel for donations being lower in larger social 
groups. In the rest of the paper, we explore these relationships empirically.  
3  Data 
Our sample for analysis comprises 566,240 donations made to 39,238 pages where the fundraiser 
linked their fundraising page to their Facebook page. This is after some cleaning. We remove 3,817 
pages where we cannot identify the charity registration number for England and Wales. We also 
drop 30 pages with zero friends and 364 with zero amounts donated. We remove outliers, including 
pages with individual donations of £170+ (top 1%), pages which raised £3,241+ (top 1%) and pages 
with fundraising targets of £100,000 or more (37 pages).   
We have all information that is publicly available on the fundraising pages. This includes the 
name of the charity, whether or not there is a fundraising target, the number of donations and the 
total amount raised. We also have information on all the donations made online to the pages, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This can be derived by total differentiation of (4) with respect to 𝑣!∗  and 𝑁! , as we did earlier for the basic model. 
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including the date the donation was made, the amount given and the name of the donor where 
available (just over 7% of donations are made anonymously).  
Table 2 provides basic summary statistics for the cleaned sample. A typical page has ten 
donations and raises just over £130 in total. The majority of pages have a fundraising target – 
typically £300. We discuss below how target-setting responds to group size and may in turn affect 
donation behaviour; in our analysis we look separately at pages without fundraising targets as a 
robustness check. In this setting, the main role of the targets is to signal how much money the 
fundraiser wants to raise. The targets are not binding (unlike the case of crowd-funding, for 
example) and donations are made irrespective of whether or not that target is reached. The 
fundraiser’s target is also not typically linked to the funding of specific projects; instead the money 
raised usually provides the charity with general funds. 
Table 2 also provides information on the number of Facebook friends in our sample of 
fundraisers. Figure 1 compares the (mean) number of Facebook friends among fundraisers with the 
(mean) number of Facebook friends in the wider population. For the youngest age group (aged 18 – 
34), the number of Facebook friends in the JustGiving sample is broadly representative of the 
population. This implies that these individuals do not only link their fundraising page to a Facebook 
page when they have an above-average number of friends. Older fundraisers look more selected in 
terms of the number of their Facebook friends – this may be selection into fundraising or into 
linking to Facebook. As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis only on the younger group of 
fundraisers.  
JustGiving.com classify individual fundraising activities into different types. Most involve 
sporting activities. Running events (particularly marathons) are the most common (39.5% pages), 
followed by Walking (14.8%) and Cycling (11.4%). Other specified sporting events include 
Parachuting (2.3%), Swimming (1.8%) and Triathlon (1.6%). Non-sporting activities include 
Memorials (3.9%), Appeals (0.5%) and Anniversaries, including weddings and birthdays (0.3%). 
There is also a substantial category of “other” activities (24.0%). Table 3 shows variation in 
fundraising behaviour (donation size, number of donations and total amounts raised) across these 
different event types. Individuals doing triathlons typically attract the largest number of donations 
and raise the most money in total. Anniversaries are associated with the largest (mean) amounts 
donated.  
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JustGiving.com also collects additional demographic information on fundraisers including 
their gender, their age and their household income, based on a household-specific market research 
classification. Table 3 shows that there is variation in fundraising behaviour – and number of 
Facebook friends – across these characteristics; our main empirical results therefore include these 
characteristics as controls in looking at the relationship between group size and donations.  
4  Main findings on social group size and donations 
We are interested in modeling the relationship between social group size and donations. We define 
NF  as the number of Facebook friends of fundraiser F , our measure of social group size. We are 
interested in three donation outcomes. The first is the total number of donations, nF , received by 
the fundraiser (nF ≤ NF ). The second is the amount of money given by each individual i  (with giF
being the contribution of donor i  to fundraiser F ’s fundraising page). The third is the total amount 
raised by the fundraiser, GF = giFF∑ . The key relationships between social group size and these 
three different donation outcomes are presented in Figure 2 and explored further in a series of 
regressions. In the analysis we focus only on fundraisers with fewer than 500 friends.7 
For outcomes at the fundraising page-level, Fy  (the total number of donations, total amount 
raised), we estimate the following specification: 
  yF =α + βNF +
!
γ 1
T !XF + µF ,   (5) 
where α , β and γ  are the parameters to be estimated;  
!
XF  is a vector of controls for the 
characteristics of the fundraiser and the fundraising page, including age, household income and 
gender of the fundraiser and whether the fundraising page has a target, charity size, overseas charity 
and event type; and µ  is the error term. We also include a set of month and year dummies.  
For outcomes at the donor level, yiF , (contribution size), we estimate the following 
specification:  
  yiF =α + βNF +
!
γ 1
T !XF +
!
γ 2
T !ZiF + ε iF ,   (6) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Since Dunbar (1992) this has been seen as a maximum number of plausibly meaningful relationships. 
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where 𝑍!" includes additional controls for the gender of the donor8 and whether the donation is  
made anonymously, and where ε  is the individual specific error term. We cluster standard errors at 
the page level.  
The results for all three donation outcomes are reported in Table 4. Column (I) presents 
specifications that include only the number of Facebook friends. Column (II) adds the additional 
controls. We also allow for non-linearities in the relationship between group size and donation 
outcomes (Column (III)).  
We find that the number of donors is positively correlated with group size, although the 
magnitude is small. Focusing on the specification in column III, the results imply that moving from 
the 10th to the 50th percentile in the distribution of Facebook friends (from 82 to 250 friends) 
translates into just over one extra donation. This small effect may reflect the fact that an individual’s 
Facebook network is typically larger than their real world social network – closer friends, family and 
colleagues who may be more likely to respond to a solicitation for donations. Nevertheless, the 
result indicates that the number of Facebook friends picks up something meaningful about an 
individual’s social group size that affects donor behaviour.  
Contribution size is negatively correlated with group size. The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient implies that moving from the 10th to the 50th percentile in the distribution of Facebook 
friends of the fundraiser reduces the average amount given to a page by £3.00 on average. In this 
specification, the coefficient measures the effect of the fundraiser’s social group size on the average 
contribution size to the fundraiser’s page. This may be affected either by changes in donation size 
among all donors to a page and/or by changes in the marginal donor: If more people give in larger 
social groups, the marginal donor may give less, reducing the average. To shed light on this, we look 
at the relationship between group size and the maximum donation to each page. We also look at the 
relationship between the amount given and group size by order of the donation on the page – 
selecting only the first donations to a page, the second donations to a page and so on, up to the fifth.  
Showing that a negative relationship is present even for the first donation to each page is important 
since later donations may be affected by how much has previously been given (Smith et. al., 2013). 
The results are reported in Table 4. We find that the negative relationship holds in all cases. There is 
a negative relationship between social group size and the size of the first donation to each 
fundraising page (as well as the size of the second, third, fourth and fifth donations). The size of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 We use the donor’s name to assign gender. 
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largest donation to each fundraising page is also smaller in larger social groups. Taken together, we 
find this to be very strong evidence that donations are smaller in larger social groups.  
Our final outcome is the total amount raised. We find no significant relationship with social 
group size, suggesting that the effect on the number of donations and the effect on donation size 
roughly cancel out. Below, we show that this relationship holds for pages both with and without 
targets.  
To what extent can we treat group size as exogenous and so interpret these as causal 
relationships? The advantage of using the number of Facebook friends at the start of the fundraising 
campaign size is that it will not be affected by individual fundraising activity. The only exception 
would be if individuals proactively added to their Facebook friendship networks prior to beginning 
fundraising. We cannot rule this out but we consider it to be unlikely. More plausibly, the number of 
Facebook friends may be correlated with other characteristics of the fundraiser and/or their donors 
that also affect donations to the page (for example, young people typically have more friends and 
may also have younger friends who give less). However, our results are robust to controlling for key 
fundraiser characteristics which proxy for donor characteristics under the assumption of network 
homophily.  
It is possible that there are other characteristics of the fundraiser or the members of their 
social group that we cannot control for and that may be correlated with both the number of 
Facebook friends (social group size) and how much is donated. The literature suggests a number of 
potential candidate factors that affect social group size including popularity (Conti et. al., 2012), 
narcissism (Carpenter, 2012) and brain size (Kanai et. al., 2012), but none of these plausibly explains 
the strong negative relationship between group size and contributions. We therefore interpret our 
findings as saying something meaningful about the effect of group size on donations to the 
fundraising page.    
Finally, we also investigate the role of target setting and the relationship with group size. The 
results are reported in Table 6. Column I shows that target-setting is more likely in larger social 
groups, which is a reasonable response if fundraisers anticipate more free-riding, while Column II 
shows that the target amount is not affected by the group size. Columns III and IV show that social 
group size has a negative effect on the probability that the target is met and the proportion of the 
target that is reached. This is also consistent with greater free-riding and it being harder to co-
ordinate behaviour across donors in larger social groups. Columns V-VII show that there is no 
significant difference in the relationship between donation behaviour and social group size across 
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pages with and without a target. This means that the observed relationships between giving and 
group size cannot be explained by the presence of targets.  
5  Discussion 
This paper has provided novel and robust evidence on the effect of social group size on private 
contributions to public goods in a real world setting. We have a strong finding that contributions are 
smaller in larger social groups, even when we control for characteristics such as age and income that 
are likely to affect both social group size and contribution size. We can rule out that this is 
attributable to free-riding on (total) public good provision. Instead we have shown that the negative 
correlation is consistent with a relational warm glow motivation for giving where donors are 
altruistic towards fundraisers and fundraisers, in turn, care about the total amount of money they 
raise. In this setting, donations are motivated not (just) by the desire to contribute to the public 
good, but also by the personal relationship between fundraiser and donor.  
We do not rule out that other explanations might also be relevant in this context.  For 
example, a number of studies have suggested that donations may be motivated by a desire to signal 
generosity or wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998). This is relevant to online 
fundraising where most donations are public and are visible to other (subsequent) donors as well as 
to the fundraiser. In this case, however, it seems likely that there would be a positive effect of social 
group size on donation size since there would be a higher return to signalling to a larger group, i.e. 
there would be a race to the top. Another possibility is that the extent to which donors experience 
relational warm glow may depend on the strength of the personal relationship between the donor 
and the fundraiser which may be weaker in larger social groups simply because the fundraiser has 
less time and effort to devote to each member of the social group.  We consider this to be highly 
likely, although we cannot test it directly with these data. We would regard this as a complementary 
rather than a competing mechanism that would tend to strengthen the relational warm glow in 
smaller groups. It would tend to confirm that the social dimensions of giving and, more specifically, 
personal relationships play a significant role in shaping donation choices. It also indicates that 
research on the social dimensions of giving should take account of pre-existing structures of social 
relationships that will affect giving behaviour.   
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Figure 1: Mean number of Facebook friends (by age) 
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Figure 2: Relationship between social group size and donations 
 
 
Number of donations per page 
 
Mean donation size (£) 
  
 
 
 
Total amount raised (£) 
 
 
These figures plot the means of the total number of donations per page, donation size and total 
amount raised per page, by number of facebook friends (shown by the scatter points), together with 
smoothed running lines and confidence intervals.  
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Table 1. Which factors are important in deciding how much to give? 
 Very 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Not very 
important 
Not at all 
important 
Not 
applicable 
A sense that my money will be used 
efficiently/ effectively  
56.1% 35.0% 6.9% 1.6% 0.6% 
The charity’s cause or mission  45.1% 44.1% 8.4% 1.9% 0.6% 
My income and what I can afford  45.3% 42.3% 9.0% 2.5% 0.8% 
A personal connection to the fundraiser 41.5% 43.4% 10.6% 3.5% 1.1% 
The fundraiser’s reason for fundraising 38.0% 48.0% 10.1% 3.0% 1.0% 
The reputation of the charity 32.7% 47.5% 15.3% 3.4% 1.0% 
Tax relief (i.e. Gift Aid) 21.7% 34.8% 23.5% 14.3% 5.8% 
Type of fundraising event 14.4% 45.8% 29.8% 8.6% 1.5% 
The name of the charity 14.1% 39.4% 32.5% 12.1% 1.9% 
The total amount the fundraiser is seeking to 
raise 
3.3% 28.0% 38.9% 24.9% 5.1% 
How much other people have given to the 
fundraiser 
2.7% 21.6% 39.0% 33.1% 3.7% 
An individual amount suggested by the 
fundraiser 
1.4% 15.9% 39.6% 29.9% 13.2% 
Note to table: These responses are from a survey of JustGiving users carried out in 2012. The relevant sample 
for this question was 17,989 people who had previously sponsored a fundraiser  
 
 
 
Table 2. Sample summary statistics 
 
 Mean St. dev. Min. 1st pctile Med. 99th 
Pctile 
Max. 
Number of donations per page 14.5 16.5 1 1 9 79 308 
Total raised online per page £347.4 £831.9 £2 £5 £134 £2,200 £3,222 
Online donations 17.7 18.2 1 2 10 100 170 
Prop. of pages with target 0.719       
Target amounts £719.4 £2480.6 £0.1 £50 £300 £5,000 £100,000 
Number of friends 329.1 316.2 1 24 251 1,410 5,695 
Number of pages 39,238       
Number of donations 566,240       
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 Table 3: Variation in fundraising 
 Proportion 
of sample 
Number of 
donations 
Total 
amount 
raised (£) 
Mean 
donation 
(£) 
Number of 
friends 
Source of data 
Male fundraiser 0.473 16.2 328.6 18.3 342.6 Information from 
Justgiving Female fundraiser 0.526 13.0 246.4 16.9 315.2 
FR Age       
Age classification 
based on postcode 
and address 
18-25 0.149 13.1 231.6 15.6 481.5 
26-30 0.172 14.4 265.5 16.7 361.6 
31-35 0.149 15.6 300.0 17.6 311.8 
36-40 0.166 15.0 303.0 18.1 266.3 
41-45 0.137 14.6 304.9 18.7 273.5 
46-50 0.094 14.5 312.0 19.0 297.0 
51-55 0.050 14.4 313.5 19.2 276.2 
56-60 0.028 14.6 301.7 18.7 255.5 
61-65 0.018 13.4 289.2 19.4 304.7 
66-70 0.012 13.6 282.5 17.8 314.8 
71-75 0.007 13.2 261.1 17.5 317.8 
76+ 0.018 15.5 296.9 17.1 335.0 
FR Hhold income       
Income 
classification based 
on postcode and 
address 
<£10K 0.071 12.3 215.5 15.7 372.4 
£10K-£15K 0.036 12.1 213.6 15.9 403.2 
£15K-£20K 0.151 13.0 235.4 16.0 367.0 
£20K-£25K 0.178 13.2 247.6 16.7 333.3 
£25K-£30K 0.164 14.1 267.4 17.0 315.8 
£30K-£40K 0.120 15.3 299.9 17.5 302.2 
£40K-£50K 0.078 15.4 305.8 18.0 300.2 
£50K-£60K 0.120 16.7 358.0 19.3 295.3 
£60K-£75K 0.064 18.2 436.3 21.6 313.9 
£75K+ 0.016 21.1 526.8 23.2 316.9 
Event type       
Justgiving 
classification 
Anniversaries 0.003 12.5 361.8 26.9 260.3 
Appeals 0.006 12.0 216.3 15.4 416.3 
Memorials 0.038 17.3 386.0 19.3 349.9 
Cycling 0.113 13.8 282.3 18.7 269.1 
Parachuting 0.024 12.5 220.8 15.9 406.7 
Running 0.376 15.9 304.8 17.6 329.4 
Swimming 0.018 13.3 231.3 16.6 283.7 
Walking 0.170 10.8 212.6 17.1 283.7 
Triathlon 0.013 19.7 433.1 20.3 299.0 
Other 0.239 15.0 303.9 17.5 391.6 
Donor gender       
Assigned based on 
donor’s first name 
Male 0.311   20.0  
Female 0.393   15.3  
Anonymous 0.073   12.8  
Unknown 0.222   20.5  
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Table 4. Main regression results (OLS regressions) 
 
 Ln( Number donations) Ln (Total amount raised) Ln (Donation size) 
 (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III) 
Friends/100 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.077*** -0.051*** -0.031*** -0.074*** -0.021*** 0.005 -0.030 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.024) 
(Friends/100)^2   -0.007   0.008***   0.007 
   (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.004) 
Male FR  0.154*** 0.155***  0.041*** 0.041***  0.252*** 0.251*** 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Target (0/1)   0.398*** 0.398***  0.047*** 0.048***  0.468*** 0.469*** 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Age 26-30  0.163*** 0.160***  0.042* 0.045*  0.193*** 0.196*** 
  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.018) (0.019)  (0.029) (0.029) 
Age 31-35  0.236*** 0.233***  0.077*** 0.082***  0.289*** 0.292*** 
  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.029) (0.029) 
Age 36-40  0.203*** 0.201***  0.071*** 0.074***  0.261*** 0.263*** 
  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.029) (0.029) 
Age 41-45  0.132*** 0.133***  0.084*** 0.085***  0.207*** 0.207*** 
  (0.024) (0.024)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.030) (0.030) 
Age 46-50  0.185*** 0.187***  0.113*** 0.112***  0.302*** 0.300*** 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.033) (0.033) 
Age 51-55  0.142*** 0.144***  0.119*** 0.118***  0.251*** 0.248*** 
  (0.031) (0.031)  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.040) (0.040) 
Age 56-60  0.221*** 0.225***  0.134*** 0.132***  0.365*** 0.362*** 
  (0.039) (0.039)  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.049) (0.049) 
Age 61-65  0.137** 0.140**  0.175*** 0.172***  0.328*** 0.325*** 
  (0.046) (0.046)  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.059) (0.059) 
Age 66-70  0.138* 0.139*  0.125*** 0.123***  0.253*** 0.252*** 
  (0.056) (0.056)  (0.032) (0.032)  (0.071) (0.071) 
Age 71-75  0.159* 0.159*  0.174* 0.174*  0.269** 0.268** 
  (0.078) (0.078)  (0.079) (0.078)  (0.098) (0.098) 
Age 76+  0.229*** 0.228***  0.107** 0.107**  0.344*** 0.345*** 
  (0.047) (0.047)  (0.034) (0.033)  (0.059) (0.059) 
Inc_10-15K  -0.011 -0.011  0.009 0.0085  0.0100 0.009 
  (0.040) (0.040)  (0.025) (0.024)  (0.050) (0.050) 
Inc_15-20K  0.028 0.028  0.023 0.023  0.0680 0.068 
  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.034) (0.034) 
Inc_25-30K  0.056* 0.0567*  0.056** 0.056**  0.123*** 0.123*** 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.033) (0.033) 
Inc_30-35K  0.129*** 0.130***  0.054** 0.054**  0.205*** 0.204*** 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.033) (0.033) 
Inc_35-40K  0.236*** 0.236***  0.092*** 0.091***  0.346*** 0.346*** 
  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.035) (0.035) 
Inc_40-50K  0.253*** 0.254***  0.110*** 0.109***  0.389*** 0.388*** 
  (0.030) (0.030)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.038) (0.038) 
Inc_50-60K  0.301*** 0.302***  0.179*** 0.178***  0.517*** 0.516*** 
  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.035) (0.035) 
Inc_60-75K  0.458*** 0.459***  0.309*** 0.308***  0.801*** 0.800*** 
  (0.032) (0.032)  (0.020) (0.020)  (0.041) (0.041) 
Inc_75K+  0.542*** 0.544***  0.372*** 0.369***  0.965*** 0.962*** 
  (0.051) (0.051)  (0.037) (0.037)  (0.064) (0.064) 
Appeals  0.208 0.210  -0.464*** -0.467***  -0.381* -0.382* 
  (0.131) (0.131)  (0.095) (0.094)  (0.165) (0.165) 
Memorials  0.318** 0.318**  -0.154* -0.155*  0.164 0.164 
  (0.103) (0.103)  (0.068) (0.068)  (0.130) (0.130) 
Cycling  0.0693 0.069  -0.325*** -0.326***  -0.314* -0.314* 
  (0.100) (0.100)  (0.064) (0.065)  (0.126) (0.126) 
Parachuting  -0.006 -0.007  -0.365*** -0.365***  -0.389** -0.388** 
  (0.107) (0.107)  (0.066) (0.066)  (0.135) (0.135) 
Running  0.132 0.132  -0.348*** -0.349***  -0.290* -0.290* 
  (0.098) (0.098)  (0.064) (0.064)  (0.125) (0.125) 
Swimming  0.078 0.0791  -0.396*** -0.396***  -0.380** -0.381** 
  (0.107) (0.107)  (0.068) (0.068)  (0.135) (0.135) 
Walking  -0.089 -0.089  -0.349*** -0.349***  -0.566*** -0.566*** 
  (0.099) (0.099)  (0.064) (0.064)  (0.126) (0.126) 
Triathlon  0.454*** 0.453***  -0.271*** -0.271***  0.156 0.157 
  (0.111) (0.111)  (0.067) (0.068)  (0.140) (0.140) 
Other  0.072 0.072  -0.346*** -0.347***  -0.325** -0.325** 
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  (0.099) (0.099)  (0.064) (0.065)  (0.125) (0.125) 
Med charity  -0.150*** -0.150***  -0.064** -0.064**  -0.223*** -0.223*** 
  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.035) (0.035) 
Large charity  -0.163*** -0.163***  -0.062** -0.063**  -0.232*** -0.232*** 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.016)  (0.032) (0.032) 
Major charity  -0.243*** -0.243***  -0.062** -0.063**  -0.308*** -0.308*** 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.032) (0.032) 
Size unknown  -0.105*** -0.105***  -0.031 -0.031  -0.117*** -0.117*** 
  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.031) (0.031) 
Overseas char  0.020 0.0201  0.138*** 0.139***  0.212*** 0.213*** 
  (0.041) (0.041)  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.052) (0.052) 
Female     -0.250*** -0.250***    
     (0.004) (0.004)    
Anonymous     -0.580*** -0.580***    
     (0.015) (0.015)    
DK gender     0.010* 0.011*    
     (0.004) (0.004)    
_cons 2.075*** 1.362*** 1.326*** 2.755*** 3.295*** 3.339*** 4.906*** 4.692*** 4.727*** 
 (0.0127) (0.252) (0.252) (0.00882) (0.157) (0.158) (0.0163) (0.318) (0.319) 
N 32447 31135 31135 481291 462304 462304 32447 31135 31135 
Standard errors, clustered at the page level, in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All regressions additionally include year and month 
dummies. For variable definitions, see Table 2.  
 
 
Table 5. Robustness checks 
 
Dependent variable = ln (Donation amount) 
 Maximum 
donation 
First 
donation 
Second 
donation 
Third 
donation 
Fourth 
donation 
Fifth 
donation 
Friends/100 -0.080*** -0.127*** -0.105*** -0.093*** -0.079*** -0.094*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
(Friends/100)^2 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.008** 0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0037) 
N 31135 31135 28422 26163 24148 22351 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All regressions include full set of controls as in Table 4.  
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Table 6. Target-setting behaviour 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
 Target 
(0/1) 
Ln (Target 
amount) 
Target_met 
(0/1) 
Proportion 
target met 
Ln( Number 
donations) 
Ln (Total 
amount 
raised) 
Ln (Donation 
size) 
Friends/100 0.009*** 0.0347*** -0.007** -0.005** 0.040*** -0.028*** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) 
Friends/100_target     -0.000 -0.004 0.008 
     (0.010) (0.006) (0.013) 
Male_FR 0.045*** 0.319*** -0.018** -0.007 0.154*** 0.041*** 0.252*** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.007) (0.015) 
Age 26-30 -0.030** 0.082** 0.030** 0.035*** 0.163*** 0.042* 0.193*** 
 (0.009) (0.027) (0.011) (0.008) (0.023) (0.018) (0.029) 
Age 31-35 -0.054*** 0.143*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.236*** 0.077*** 0.290*** 
 (0.010) (0.028) (0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029) 
Age 36-40 -0.070*** 0.174*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.203*** 0.071*** 0.262*** 
 (0.009) (0.027) (0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029) 
Age 41-45 -0.062*** 0.193*** 0.012 0.014 0.132*** 0.084*** 0.207*** 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.012) (0.009) (0.024) (0.019) (0.030) 
Age 46-50 -0.067*** 0.273*** 0.016 0.018 0.185*** 0.113*** 0.302*** 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) (0.021) (0.033) 
Age 51-55 -0.054*** 0.231*** 0.016 0.018 0.142*** 0.119*** 0.251*** 
 (0.013) (0.038) (0.016) (0.012) (0.031) (0.026) (0.040) 
Age 56-60 -0.031 0.276*** 0.010 0.035* 0.221*** 0.134*** 0.365*** 
 (0.016) (0.046) (0.019) (0.015) (0.039) (0.025) (0.049) 
Age 61-65 -0.064** 0.299*** 0.013 0.027 0.137** 0.174*** 0.329*** 
 (0.020) (0.057) (0.024) (0.018) (0.046) (0.028) (0.059) 
Age 66-70 -0.045 0.187** -0.010 -0.023 0.138* 0.124*** 0.254*** 
 (0.024) (0.068) (0.028) (0.022) (0.056) (0.032) (0.071) 
Age 71-75 -0.034 0.357*** -0.023 -0.009 0.159* 0.174* 0.269** 
 (0.033) (0.094) (0.039) (0.031) (0.078) (0.079) (0.098) 
Age 76+ -0.005 0.237*** 0.042 0.038* 0.229*** 0.107** 0.345*** 
 (0.020) (0.056) (0.023) (0.018) (0.047) (0.033) (0.059) 
Inc_10-15K -0.004 0.018 -0.024 -0.019 -0.011 0.008 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.048) (0.020) (0.016) (0.040) (0.025) (0.050) 
Inc_15-20K 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.002 0.028 0.023 0.068 
 (0.011) (0.033) (0.014) (0.011) (0.027) (0.018) (0.034) 
Inc_25-30K 0.002 0.036 0.032* 0.025* 0.056* 0.056** 0.123*** 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) (0.018) (0.033) 
Inc_30-35K 0.001 0.038 0.035* 0.039*** 0.129*** 0.054** 0.205*** 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) (0.019) (0.033) 
Inc_35-40K -0.000 0.093** 0.041** 0.060*** 0.236*** 0.092*** 0.347*** 
 (0.012) (0.034) (0.014) (0.011) (0.028) (0.018) (0.035) 
Inc_40-50K 0.031* 0.102** 0.067*** 0.076*** 0.253*** 0.110*** 0.389*** 
 (0.013) (0.037) (0.015) (0.012) (0.030) (0.019) (0.038) 
Inc_50-60K 0.014 0.141*** 0.102*** 0.106*** 0.301*** 0.179*** 0.517*** 
 (0.012) (0.034) (0.014) (0.011) (0.028) (0.018) (0.035) 
Inc_60-75K 0.045** 0.343*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.458*** 0.309*** 0.802*** 
 (0.013) (0.039) (0.016) (0.012) (0.032) (0.020) (0.041) 
Inc_75K+ 0.015 0.487*** 0.168*** 0.178*** 0.542*** 0.372*** 0.964*** 
 (0.021) (0.061) (0.026) (0.020) (0.051) (0.037) (0.064) 
Appeals 0.258*** 0.430* -0.080 -0.117* 0.208 -0.464*** -0.380* 
 (0.055) (0.174) (0.073) (0.057) (0.131) (0.095) (0.165) 
Memorials 0.063 0.368* -0.076 -0.105* 0.318** -0.155* 0.164 
 (0.044) (0.144) (0.060) (0.047) (0.103) (0.068) (0.130) 
Cycling 0.205*** -0.143 -0.072 -0.076 0.069 -0.325*** -0.314* 
 (0.042) (0.139) (0.058) (0.045) (0.100) (0.064) (0.126) 
Parachuting 0.326*** 0.368* -0.208*** -0.230*** -0.006 -0.365*** -0.388** 
 (0.045) (0.145) (0.061) (0.047) (0.107) (0.066) (0.135) 
Running 0.206*** -0.122 -0.062 -0.077 0.132 -0.349*** -0.290* 
 (0.042) (0.138) (0.058) (0.045) (0.098) (0.064) (0.125) 
Swimming 0.191*** -0.317* -0.028 -0.075 0.078 -0.396*** -0.380** 
 (0.045) (0.147) (0.062) (0.048) (0.107) (0.068) (0.136) 
Walking 0.176*** -0.190 -0.093 -0.111* -0.089 -0.349*** -0.566*** 
 (0.042) (0.139) (0.058) (0.045) (0.099) (0.064) (0.126) 
Triathlon 0.209*** 0.290 -0.069 -0.073 0.454*** -0.271*** 0.157 
 (0.047) (0.151) (0.063) (0.049) (0.111) (0.067) (0.140) 
Other 0.222*** 0.0800 -0.098 -0.121** 0.072 -0.346*** -0.325** 
 (0.042) (0.138) (0.058) (0.045) (0.099) (0.064) (0.125) 
	  23 
Med charity 0.004 -0.208*** -0.038** -0.025* -0.150*** -0.064** -0.223*** 
 (0.011) (0.033) (0.014) (0.011) (0.027) (0.021) (0.035) 
Large charity -0.009 -0.248*** -0.022 -0.014 -0.163*** -0.062** -0.232*** 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) (0.019) (0.032) 
Major charity 0.025* -0.305*** -0.017 -0.024* -0.243*** -0.062** -0.308*** 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.013) (0.010) (0.026) (0.019) (0.032) 
Size unknown 0.019 -0.0921** -0.032* -0.018 -0.105*** -0.031 -0.117*** 
 (0.010) (0.030) (0.012) (0.010) (0.025) (0.019) (0.031) 
Overseas char 0.074*** 0.109* 0.028 0.028 0.020 0.138*** 0.212*** 
 (0.017) (0.047) (0.019) (0.015) (0.041) (0.023) (0.052) 
Target amount   -0.000*** -0.000***    
   (0.000) (0.000)    
Target (0/1)     0.398*** 0.0571*** 0.450*** 
     (0.0265) (0.0148) (0.0334) 
Female      -0.250***  
      (0.004)  
Anonymous      -0.580***  
      (0.015)  
DK gender      0.010*  
      (0.004)  
_cons 0.710*** 7.096*** 0.145 0.372*** 1.362*** 3.288*** 4.703*** 
 (0.107) (0.291) (0.123) (0.0957) (0.252) (0.157) (0.318) 
N 31135 22185 22185 22185 31135 462304 31135 
Standard errors, clustered at the page level, in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All regressions additionally include year and month 
dummies. For variable definitions, see Table 2.  
 
 
